This is a working paper summarizing results of an ongoing research project whose aim is to uniquely characterize the uncertainty mea sure for the Dempster-Shafer Theory. A set of intuitive axiomatic requirements is pre sented, some of their implications are shown, and the proof is given of the minimality of re cently proposed measure AU among all mea sures satisfying the proposed requirements.
Soon after the emergence of the Dempster-Shafer The ory (DST), researchers began their quest for a suit able measure of uncertainty (or information) for DST, which could be used in a similar manner as the Shan non entropy has been used within probability theory. However, the task is far from easy and has not been solved satisfactorily as yet. The common pitfall of the various proposed measures is the lack of property of subadditivity that is considered essential. (For more detailed discussion of the history of the search for un certainty measure for DST see [7) .)
In a recent paper [5) , Harmanec and Klir proposed a new measure of uncertainty for DST. This measure is the only measure, among those introduced in the literature that satisfies all basic properties (including subadditivity) one would expect from such a measure. Independently, the measure was also proposed in [2] and [8) , but with a somewhat different motivation.
Considering the fact that this measure is the only known measure of (total ) uncertainty for DST that is additive, subadditive and in corresponding cases col lapses into the Shannon and Hartley entropies, it is natural to ask whether these properties, poss ibly with some other intuitive properties, are sufficient to char acterize this measure. An investigation of this problem is the topic of this paper. Unfortunately, I do not have a complete solution as yet, but I present some partial results. Namely, a set of eight plausible axiomatic re quirements for a meaningful measure of uncertainty is suggested, some consequences of these requirements are shown, and the proof that the proposed measure is the smallest among all measures satisfying these ax ioms is given.
2 Notation and Basic Definitions.
Let X denote some given finite (non-empty) universal set, usually called a frame of discernment in the con text of DST. It is assumed that elements of X repre sent all possible and mutually exclusive states of some system (answers to a question etc.). Let 'P (X) denote the power set of X.
A belief function is a function Bel : 'P (X) --+ [0, 1) such that Bel (0) = 0, Bel (X) = 1, and
for all possible families of subsets of X. A belief func tion models a belief state of a Believer; Bel( A) is the degree of belief of the Believer, on the basis of avail able evidence, that the actual state ( the true answer, etc.) is in A.
A basic probability assignment is a function m :
AEP(X)
A basic probability ass ignment is again considered as an evidence function; m(A) is interpreted as a degree to which the Believer considers available evidence to support exactly A and not any of its proper subsets. Any subset A of X, for which m(A) > 0 is called a focal element of m.
AB is well known [11) , given a belief function, Bel, the function m defined by the equation
B�A for all A E P( X) is a basic probability ass ignment ( called the basic probability ass ignment associated with Bel). Similarly, given a basic probability assign ment m the function Bel defined by
Bel(A) = L m(B) B�A for all A E P( X) is a belief function (called the be lief function associated with m). Using this corre spondence we can freely switch arguments �bout belief functions and basic probability assignments without worrying about inconsistency or misunderstanding.
Let Y = {E1,_Eh, .
•. ,EN} denote a partition of X, i.e., Ei n Ej = 0 fori=/: j and uf:_ 1 Ei = X . Then, for each A � X, the set A ! Y defined by In this section, I discuss the properties a measure of uncertainty for DST should possess . I formulate the requirements in terms of basic probability assignments since it is simpler from a technical point of view, but belief functions or plausibility functions (see [11) for definition) could be used for this purpose as well.
(RO) Functionality. The sought uncertainty mea sure should be a mapping U that ass igns a real number to each basic probability ass ignment m on every finite frame of discernment X. For the purpose of this pa per, I consider m to be a 6et of ordered pairs (A, m( A) ),
where A E P( X) and m( A) is a basic probability num ber corresponding to A. Sometimes, I list only those pairs that correspond to the focal elements of m, and omit pairs with zero basic probability number. For mally, U: m�--+ U(m),
and all finite X's, where
(Rl) Label Independency. The measure of uncer tainty should not depend on the names of system's states (answers etc.) . For example,
ought to have the same amount of uncertainty. For mally, let X, Y be two finite sets such that lXI = IYI and let 1r : X ----+ Y be a one to one mapping of X onto Y. Extend 1r in the usual way onto power sets:
let m be a basic probability assignment on X. Define a basic probability assignment 1r (m) on Y by for all BE 'P (Y), where ?r-1 denotes the inverse map ping for ?r. Then it is required that
U(m) =U (1r(m)).
Thanks to this requirement, we can restrict our consid erations to one "canonical" frame of discernment with given cardinality N, e.g. {1, 2, . .. , N}, without any loss of generality. Therefore, we can further simplify our notation. For any given natural number N 2:: 2, we deal with a function of 2 N -1 variables
which is defined on all 2 N -1-tuples such that m1 2:: 0, I � {1, 2, .. . , N} and E0 #�{ 1,2, .. . , N } m1 = 1. The empty set can be omitted since its basic probability number is always zero and, therefore, it does not have any influence on the value of UN. The requirement can now be reformulated as an requirement of symmetry.
(Rl') Symmetry. For every N, every permutation 1r of {1, 2, ... , N}, and every basic probability assign ment m on {1,2, ... ,N} . (R4) Subadditivity. Assume that the system de scribed by the set of states X can be divided into two subsystems with their respective sets of states being Yt and Y2. Then by projecting our beliefs (basic prob ability assignment) onto Yt and }2 we preserve our knowledge (or information, if you wish) about subsys tems, but we loose our knowledge about the interaction between the subsystems. Therefore, uncertainty con tained in our knowledge of the whole system should not decrease by projecting it on subsystems.
Formally: Let Y 1 = {A1,A2, ... , Ap} and Y 2 = { B1, B 2, .. . , BQ} be two distinct partitions of X, such that IAi n Bj I = 1 for all i E {1, 2, ... , P} and all j E {1,2, ... ,Q}. Then for an arbitrary basic proba bility assignment m on X (R5) Additivity. This requirement supplements the previous one. In the setting of the previous require ment, the overall uncertainty should be the same after the projections onto the subsystems if there is no in teraction between subsystems.
Again, let Yt {At. A2, .. . , Ap } and Y2 = { B 1, B2, ... , BQ} be two (different) partitions of X, such that IAi n Bj I = 1 for all i E {1, 2, ... , P} and all j E {1, 2, ... , Q}. Moreover, let m be a basic probabil ity assignment on X such that for every focal element Aofm,
(R6) Monotone Dispensability. According to this requirement, the uncertainty should not decrease af ter transferring part of basic probability mass from a focal element A onto one of its supersets. In terms of belief functions, if we decrease our belief in a subset A of X without otherwise changing our beliefs (except those implied by our original belief in A) we should not decrease our uncertainty.
Formally, let m be a basic probability ass ignment on X and A an arbitrary focal element of m. (R 7) Probablllstlc N ormallzatlon. To guarantee that the probabilistic (or conflict) component of un certainty in DST [7] is measured in bits, it must hold that (R8) Nonspeclficity Normallzatlon. To guaran tee that the nonspecificity component of uncertainty in DST [7] is measured in bits, it must hold that u2 (o,o, 1) = 1. In this section, I derive some consequences of the eight requirements stated and discussed in Section 3.
Theorem 1 For any mapping U satisfying require ments {R1}, (R3}, and (R4) specified in Section 3 and any basic probability assignment m on a finite frame of discernment X,
Proof. The proof is a direct generalization of the cor responding proof in the characterization of the Shan non entropy [4] . It is enough to show that for all N � 2 and all (2 N -1)-tuples (m�,m2 , ... ,mN,m12, .. . ,m12 ... N) such that m1 � 0, 0 -:/= I £:;; {1, 2, ... , N} and 2:: iil#<;;; {l,2, ... ,N} m1 = 1. m1,m2, ... ,mN,O, ... ,0,  m12, ... ,m1N,o, ... ,0, ... ,m12 ... N,o, . .. ,0), (1} and by subadditivity (R4) and symmetry (R1), we get UN2 (m1,m2, ... ,mN,O, ... ,0,  m12, ... ,m1N,o, ... ,0, ... ,m12 ... N,o 
. N).
(To better see this step, one can imagine instead of {1,2, ... ,N 2 } the Cartesian product {1,2, ... ,N} X {1, 2, ... , N}; the (potentially) non-zero elements m1, ... , m12 ... N then correspond to the "diagonal" elements of the Cartesian product, as illustrated in Figure  1 .) From (1) and (2), we may conclude Theorem 2 Assume that N � 2, mi � 0 for i E {1,2, ... ,N} and Ef: 1 mi = 1. Then, for any map ping U satisfying requirements {R1}-(R5}, and (R7} specified in Section 9, it holds that N UN (mt,m2, ... ,rnN,O, ... ,0) =-L mi log2mi.
i =l
Proof. Forte [4] showed that the only function K.N defined on N-tuples (p1,p2, . .. , PN) such that Pi � 0, i E {1, 2, ... , N} and 2:: ! 1 Pi = 1, which is symmetric, expansible, additive, subadditive, satisfying the nor malization K-2 (!, ! ) = 1 and the condition
p--+0+
is the Shannon entropy. Since our requirements of symmetry, expansibility, additivity, subadditivity and probabilistic normalization corresponds under the as sumptions of the theorem exactly to the respective Forte's axioms, and since the continuity requirement implies the condition (3} , the theorem follows.
• Theorem 3 For any mapping U satisfying require ments (R1}, {R3}, {R5}, (R6}, and {RB} u ((A, 1)) = log 2 IA I , for arbitrary finite frame of discernment X and arbi trary A� X.
Proof. Renyi [10] showed that the only function I defined on natural numbers (� 1), which satisfies
is the Hartley entropy. However, from the label independency and the expansibility we know that U ((A, 1)) depends only on the cardinality of A, so we are looking for a function f defined on natural num bers (� 1), such that
From additivity we know that f satisfies (a), from monotone dispensability it has to obey (b), and non specificity normalization guarantees (c). Therefore the theorem follows from Renyi's result.
• Corollary 4 For any mapping U satisfying require ments {R1}, (R:J}, {R5}, {R6}, and (RB}, and any ba sic probability assignment m on a finite frame of dis cernment X, u (m) ::::; log 2 IXI .
Proof. It is enough to consider X= {1, 2, ... , N}. By repeated use of monotone dispensability, we get UN (0, m2, m3, ... , mN, m12, . .. , m12 ... N + m1) :S :SUN (0, 0, .. . , 1).
UN (m) :S
Then, by Theorem 3,
Minimality of the Uncertainty Measure AU Before proving that the proposed measure AU is min imal, let me show that AU satisfies the requirements (RO) -(R8) and, therefore, at least one uncertainty measure satisfies all these requirements.
Let X denote a (finite) frame of dis cernment and Bel a belief function defined on X. We define the measure of uncertainty contained in Bel, denoted as AU (Bel), by
where the maximum is taken over all {P x} zEX such that Pz E [0, 1] for all x EX, L:xEX Px = 1, and for all A� X, Bel (A)� l:xEA Px·
Note that the maximum always exists since we are maximizing a continuous function on a simplex1. To be able to take an advantage of the basic probability ass ignment, we need the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Dempster [3] ) Let X be a frame of dis cernment, Bel a belief function on X and m the cor responding basic probability assignment; then a tuple <:P z) xEX satisfies the following constmints 
Proof.
Requirements (R1) -(R3) follow directly from the definition of AU. In our previous paper [5] , we showed that AU satisfies requirements (R4) and (R5). In the same paper we have also shown that AU collapses to the Shannon entropy and the Hartley entropy in the corresponding cases. This fact implies requirements (R7) and (R8). It only remains to show that AU obeys the requirement (R6).
Let X, A, B, a, m, and m' have the same mean ing as in the ass umptions of the requirement (R6) . Let ( pz) zEX be such a tuple that Pz 2: 0, for X E X, L: :e EX Px = 1, for all C � X L:xEC Pz 2: Bel (C), where Bel denotes the belief function cor responding to the basic probability assignment m, and -L:xEX Px log 2P z = AU (m). Then by Theo rem 5, there exist non-negative real numbers {3(; for all 0 of:. C � X and all x E C such that and L {3(; =m(C).
zlzEC Put !3 '1 = a.f3 � for all x E A, !3' § = !3 8 + (1 -a) .,B � for all x E A, ,B ' § = !3 8 for all x E B-A, and !3 :5 = {3(; for all 0 # C �X, C of:. A, C # B, and all X E C. Since This concludes the proof of the theorem.
• Now we know that there is at least one uncertainty measure satisfying all the requirements (RO) -(R8).
The question is, whether it is also the only one with this property. I do not know the answer to this ques tion as yet, but I can show that AU is the smallest measure satisfying all the requirements.
Theorem 7 Let X denote a (finite) frame of dis cernment and m a basic probability assignment on X. Then for any mapping U satisfying all the requirements {RO} -{RB), we have AU (m) $U (m).
Let Bel denote the belief function on X corresponding tom. Consider arbitrary ( p x) xEX , Px E It follows from (4) and (5) that (5) AU( {({x},Px)lx EX})$U (m)
for any (Px) xEX• Px E [0, 1], LxEX Px = 1, such that Bel (A) $ LxEA Px· However, the inequality (6) still holds if we take maximum over all acceptable (px) xEX on the left hand side max AU ({({x} , p x) I x EX}) $ U (m).
We may conclude the proof of the theorem by realizing that max AU ({({x} ,Px) I X EX})= AU (m).
• 6 Conclusion I presented and tried to justify a set of eight require ments, which I deem essential for any reasonable mea sure of uncertainty for DST. I proved some conse quences of these requirements and showed that the recently proposed measure AU [5] satisfies all the re quired axioms. The question, whether AU is the only measure satisfying these requirements or not remains an open problem. Depending on the solution of this problem, we can look at Theorem 7 from two different angles. It can be either considered as a step toward uniqueness proof or it can be considered as a justifica tion for choosing AU as the measure of uncertainty for DST. It seems reasonable to take the "smallest" mea sure, since we do not want to attach to a belief function more uncertainty than necessary. Though this require ment is probably less appealing than the requirements (RO) -(R8), it looks like a good practical guidance in the choice of the uncertainty measure for DST.
